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7 decision trials we estimated the subjective value that they assigned to each stimulus. In probe trials, 8 they were presented with a single stimulus at center and made a saccade to a peripheral location. We 9 found that the reaction time and peak velocity of that saccade varied roughly linearly from loss to gain 10 with the subjective value of the stimulus. Naturally, participants differed in how much they valued a 11 given stimulus. Remarkably, those who valued a stimulus more, as evidenced by their choices in decision 12 trials, tended to move with greater vigor in response to that stimulus in probe trials. Thus, saccade vigor 13 partly reflected the subjective value that the brain assigned the stimulus. However, the influence of 14 subjective value on vigor was only a modest predictor of preference: vigor in probe trials allowed us to 15 predict choice in decision trials with roughly 60% accuracy. 16 17
New and Noteworthy 18 We found that saccade vigor tends to vary monotonically with subjective value: smallest for stimuli that 19 predict a loss, and highest for stimuli that predict a gain. Notably, between-subject differences in 20 valuation could be gleaned from the between-subject differences in their patterns of vigor. However, 21 the influence of subjective value on vigor was modest, allowing partial ability to infer subjective value 22 for the purpose of predicting choice in decision trials. Theory of subjective value was introduced in the 19 th century to account for the fact that in voluntary 5 transactions, each party values the goods, labor, or money that they receive more than the goods, labor, 6 or money that they provide (Jevons, 1866; Menger, 1871) . The theory posited that subjective value is not 7 specified by an objective property of the good, but rather the incremental increase in pleasure that an 8 individual assigns to acquisition of that good (Jevons, 1866) . Although subjective valuation is an 9 important aspect of behavioral economics, it is an abstract quantity that cannot be measured directly. 10 Rather, it must be inferred from decisions that individuals make (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), 11 often in scenarios involving lotteries and risky options.
12
A serendipitous discovery in motor neuroscience has been the observation that factors that 13 affect preference, such as reward and effort, also affect movements . For option is partly influenced by the subjective value that they assign to that option. 25 Previous work has established that when people are presented with a decision between two 26 options, their deliberation time is a measure of their strength of preference: participants typically decide 27 sooner if they prefer one stimulus much more than another (Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2018; Konovalov 
28
and Krajbich, 2019). Thus, these works have demonstrated that certain aspects of behavior during 29 decision making are related to the difference in the subjective value of the two options.
30
Here, we asked a different question: suppose one could only observe movements during 31 presentation of a single stimulus, but not during decision-making. Can one infer subjective value from 32 the movement vigor toward single stimuli A and B, and then predict choice when the subject decides 33 between A and B? If so, how well might movement vigor in single stimulus trials allow one to predict 34 subjective value, and thus choice in decision trials?
35
It is possible that vigor may not reflect subjective value, but rather an aspect of attention 36 allocated to the stimulus. For example, both the stimulus that promises a gain and the stimulus that 37 foretells a penalty are important and will garner more attention than stimuli that promise smaller gain 38 and loss. In this scenario, vigor will not increase monotonically with subjective value, but rather produce 39 a U-shaped function, becoming large for both gains and losses. 40 1 partly modulated by the excitatory inputs that the superior colliculus receives from the cortical regions 2 which compute subjective value: the frontal eye field (FEF) (Hanes and Schall, 1996 Glimcher, 2010) . LIP neurons that encode stimulus value exhibit greater activity both when the stimulus 5 promises a large reward, and when the stimulus promises a large penalty (Leathers and Olson, 2012).
6
Some of these neurons exhibit sensitivity to both novelty and value (Foley et al., 2014) . Furthermore, 7 some dopamine neurons increase their activity when the stimulus promises reward, whereas others 8 increase their activity for both punishment and reward (Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009 ). Thus, the 9 neural activity that could modulate saccade vigor shows positive sensitivity to gain, as well as loss. This 10 leads us to the question of whether vigor monotonically reflects valuation over a range that includes 11 both losses and gains, or is vigor a U-shaped function of value.
12
Here measured saccades in a task where humans learned to associate value to 10 abstract 13 stimuli, each paired with a different magnitude of loss or gain. By design, the task involved learning, 14 which we hoped would result in some participants valuing a given stimulus highly, whereas others would 15 value it less. In probe trials, we presented one stimulus at random and measured saccade vigor. In 16 decision trials, the participants deliberated between various stimuli and made a choice, from which we 17 also inferred the subjective value that they assigned to each stimulus. We found that in probe trials, 18 saccade vigor was lowest for stimuli that promised a loss, and highest for stimuli that promised a gain.
19
However, while vigor was clearly affected by subjective value, this effect was modest: using vigor in 20 probe trials as a proxy for subjective value, we could correctly predict about 60% of the choices made in 21 decision trials. 22 23
Materials and Method 24
Healthy participants (n=24, 26.38.2 years old, meanSD, 8 females) with no known neurological 25 disorders and normal color vision sat in a well-lit room in front of an LED monitor (59.7 x 33.6 cm, 2560 x 26 1440 pixels, light gray background, frame rate 144 Hz) placed at a distance of 35 cm. Their head was 27 restrained using a bite bar. They viewed visual stimuli on the screen, and we measured their eye 28 movements using an EyeLink 1000 (SR Research) infrared recording system (sampling rate 1 KHz). Only 29 the right eye was tracked. All participants were naïve to the paradigm. The experiments were approved 30 by the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine Institutional Review Board, and all participants 31 signed the written consent form approved by the board. Participants were paid $15/hour regardless of 32 any behavioral outcome. One participant was excluded from the results presented here because their 33 performance in the task was at chance level, suggesting that they did not learn to assign value to the 34 various stimuli.
36

Stimulus properties
37
We performed an experiment in which through experience, people learned the value of 10 abstract 38 visual stimuli. Each stimulus was a 2 x 2 colored square, designated with a "+" or "-" (Fig. 1B) . Each 39 square was randomly assigned to a point distribution, with a mean that ranged from loss of 5 points to 40 gain of 5 points. The points associated with each color were selected randomly on each trial from a beta 41 1 4, …, +5. The plus and minus indicator at the center of the square noted the sign of the mean of the 2 distribution. The color-to-point relationship was selected randomly for each subject, but remained 3 consistent throughout the experiment. For example, the plus yellow square in Fig. 1B was associated   4 with a distribution with mean equal to gain of 4 points, and the minus yellow square was associated 5 with mean equal to loss of 4 points. In addition to these 10 colored squares, a black square with "0" at 6 the center was associated with exactly 0 points. Thus, the experiment design used abstract stimuli that 7 through experience, participants learned to associate with points. We hoped that this would produce a 8 wide diversity in subjective values that the participants assigned to a given stimulus, allowing us to test 9 whether movement vigor was a predictor of the between participant differences in subjective value.
11
Decision and probe trials
12
The experiment contained two types of trials, randomly intermixed. Both types of trials ( Fig. 1A ) began 13 with a center fixation period that lasted for 1 sec and ended with a beep (1 KHz). In decision trials, the 14 fixation point was replaced with three different colored stimuli. One stimulus appeared alone and 15 represented a sure bet (100% probability of acquiring the points associated with that stimulus). The 16 other two stimuli appeared together and represented a risky bet (each with 50% probability). The the stimuli at center were erased and the trial consequences were displayed for 1 sec: the earned 20 stimulus was displayed at the dot location along with text that indicated the number of points acquired.
21
The points were drawn from the random distribution associated with the colored stimulus. Failure to 22 make a choice within the time limit resulted in loss of 10 points. The trial ended with the display of the 23 color stimulus and the amount of points gained or lost for that trial (duration of 1 sec).
24
In probe trials, the fixation point was removed, a single stimulus (chosen at random from the 10 25 colored stimuli) was displayed at center, and a dot appeared on the horizontal axis (at ±20). This was 26 the instruction for the subject to make a saccade to the dot. Once the saccade concluded, the stimulus 27 at center was erased and displayed at the dot location, along with text that indicated the number of 28 points that the subject had gained or lost for the trial. As in the decision trials, the points were drawn 29 from the random distribution associated with the colored stimulus. Thus, trials included stimuli that 30 were associated with gain or loss, and by making a saccade, the subject earned that gain or loss. Failure 31 to make a saccade resulted in loss of 10 points.
33
Experiment design 34 Before the start of the experiment, the participants were instructed that there were 10 stimuli 35 consisting of two sets of 5 colored boxes that represented points that could be gained or lost on each 36 trial. "Each color will indicate how many points you will gain or lose. Black box will always give zero 37 points when chosen. Boxes with plus signs will add to your score, while boxes with minus signs will 38 decrease your score. For example, if orange box with plus sign indicates gain of 10, orange box with 39 minus sign will indicate loss of 10." 40 1 and began with 100 points and included only probe trials. This first block served to teach the 2 participants the points associated with the various stimuli. The remaining 10 blocks each had 40 probe 3 trials and 60 decision trials, distributed randomly. The total score was reset to 100 at the start of the 2 nd 4 block. For probe trials, each of the 10 colored squares was presented with equal frequency within each 5 block, distributed randomly. In probe trials, the direction of the dot was chosen randomly at left or right 6 but with equal frequency within each block.
7
In a decision trial, we randomly picked 3 stimuli from among the 11 stimuli. We presented the 8 medium valued stimulus as the sure bet and the other two stimuli (one loss, and the other gain) as the 9 risky bet. Participants were not provided any information about the value of the stimuli and thus had to 10 make their decisions solely based on consequences of previous trials. The side that represented the sure 11 bet was random and chosen with equal left-right frequency for each block. Following completion of the 12 second block, the final score of the previous block was carried over as the starting score of the next 13 block. At the conclusion of every 4 th trial, the total score earned was displayed at center fixation.
15
Data analysis
16
Eye position data were filtered with a second-order Savitzky-Golay filter (frame size 11, degree 3).
17
Saccade onset and offset were determined in real time with 20°/s threshold. We identified valid 18 saccades as those that occurred between stimuli with start and endpoints that were within 5 of the 19 boundaries of the start and end images (to account for the fact that participants were not specifically 20 instructed to fixate on a precise location). For probe trials, we excluded reaction times that were larger 21 than 1 sec.
22
Our objective was to test whether behavior in probe trials reflected the subjective value that we 23 had estimated from decision trials. Thus, we analyzed vigor of saccades only in probe trials, and inferred 24 subjective value based on choices made in decision trials. Statistical testing relied on linear mixed-effect 25 models. In each model, the dependent variables were saccade peak velocity and reaction time, fixed 26 effects were stimulus objective value and subjective value, and random effects were individuals.
27
Dependent variables were normalized for each individual by dividing the measured value by the within 28 subject mean. Statistics were performed on normalized dependent variables.
30
Estimating subjective value of stimuli
31
The objective value of each stimulus was set by the mean of the point distribution associated with each 32 colored square (Fig. 1B) . The participants formed subjective values, and we inferred these values based 33 on the choices that they made in decision trials.
34
In a decision trial, the choice was between a sure option (a single stimulus) and a risky option 35 (two stimuli, 50% chance of each). To model the choices that participants made, we designed a one-36 layer perceptron network that had as its input the three stimuli that were available on each trial. The
37
output of the network was the probability of picking the sure option (Fig. 1C ). The input x was an 11 38 element vector, with each element representing one of the stimuli 1 11 ,, xx starting from the most 39 negative to the most positive, and the black square (0 points) being the sixth element. On each trial, the 40
input vector x was set so that one element had value of -1 for the sure stimulus, two elements had 41 value of 0.5 for the pair of risky stimuli, and 0 for the remaining elements. The weight vector u 1 represented the subjective value of each stimulus, and was also an 11 element vector. A linear 2 combination of the available stimuli were represented with variable z : 3
For example, if in a given trial the sure option was stimulus 4
x , and the risky option was stimuli 2 x and 5 7 x , then
In other words, the variable z represented the difference between the 6 subjective values of the two options. This was then transformed via a logistic function that produced an 7 output y that represented the probability of picking the sure option: 8
Our objective was to estimate the subjective value that the participant had assigned to each 10 stimulus, represented via the weight vector u . We assumed that the subjective value of the zero 11 stimulus (the sixth element of u ) was exactly zero. To find the remaining weights, we used a binary 12 cross-entropy loss function:
In the above equation, N is the total number of decision trials (600). Binary variable () n t represented 15 the actual decision of the participant on trial n : () 1 n t  for choosing the risky option, and () 0 n t  for 16 the sure option. To find u , we differentiated Eq.
(3) with respect to u , thus providing a stochastic 17 gradient descent estimate of the subjective values. We stopped the algorithm when the norm of change 18 of the subjective value u for was less than 10 -4 . 19 20 Using vigor in probe trials to predict choice in decision trials 21 Once we determined the reaction time and peak saccade velocity associated with a given stimulus in the 22 probe trials, we asked whether vigor could serve as a proxy for subjective value. To evaluate the 23 accuracy of such a policy we used two different approaches: a winner take all approach that predicted 24 choice in the decision trials, and a likelihood estimate approach that predicted probability of choice in 25 decision trials.
26
In the winner take all approach, for each stimulus in the probe trials we computed saccade 27 velocity and reaction time, imagined that subjective value of the stimulus was set by these variables, 28 and then on each decision trial used these measures to predict choice. For example, to evaluate the 29 vigor policy, we assigned subjective value to the 11 stimuli based on vigor on the probe trials, and then 30 used this to predict choice of the participant in each of the decision trials: pick the option that has the 31 larger vigor estimated subject value (100% of the vigor for the sure option stimulus, vs. sum of 50% of 32 vigor for each of the risky option stimuli). We compared the accuracy of this vigor-based policy with a 33 policy that made choices based on subjective values that were estimated based on the actual decisions 34 of each subject. To predict outcomes, we used the actual options faced by each participant. We used
35
Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare performance of the various policies.
36
In the likelihood estimate approach, we began by setting the vector u to be equal to the mean 1 reaction time (or peak velocity) for the various stimuli in the probe trials. We then used this vigor based 2 estimate of subjective value to predict the probability that the participant would pick the sure option in 3 a given decision trial:
In the above formulation, the term  appears because unlike Eq. (2), z in Eq. (4) has units that are 6 different than subjective value. We used Eq. (3) to guide the gradient descent procedure for finding  7 for each participant. Thus, using vigor as an estimate for subjective value, we used Eq. (4) to predict the 8 probability that on a given trial the participant would pick the sure option. We then evaluated the 9 goodness of this policy by computing the negative log likelihood (NLL). We compared the vigor based 10 policy to a random policy. NLL for the random policy was one in which the probability of choosing the 11 sure option was 0.5 (equivalent to having elements of u equal to each other). 12 13
Results 14
The participants were presented with colored stimuli that were probabilistically associated with gain or 15 loss (Fig. 1B) . In the baseline set of probe trials, they were repeatedly exposed to the color-point pairings, 16 and then in a subsequent set of decision trials they expressed their preferences.
17
On decision trials, participants were presented with a sure option and a risky option ( value of the risky option was 0.5. Indeed, this participant tended to pick the sure option if that option 25 had a value greater than 0.5. In another example, the red dots show the probability that the participant 26 picked the sure option when the risky option was -2 and +5 points. In this case, the risky option had an 27 expected value of 1.5. The participant now picked the sure option when that option had a value that 28 was greater than 1.5.
29
We used a one-layer neural network to model the choices that each participant made in the 30 decision trials and inferred the subjective value that they had assigned to each stimulus (Eq. 2). On each 31 trial, given the sure and two risky stimuli, the network predicted the probability that the subject would 32 pick the sure option (lines in Fig. 1D ). We trained the network with the actual choices that the subject 
4
The average pattern of subjective value is displayed across the participants in Fig. 1F . We found 5 that on average, subjective value strongly correlated with objective value of the stimuli (r 2 = 0.72; p<10 -6 30 ). Within participant analysis of subjective value revealed a main effect of objective value 7 (F(1,262)=585.7, p<10 -30 ), demonstrating that as the objective value of the stimuli increased, so did the 8 subjective value that the participants had assigned to them. Thus, the participants learned the task.
9
These data indicated that the participants generally learned to assign value to the abstract 10 stimuli, resulting in subjective values that increased with objective values. However, there were also 11 differences among participants, with some learning steep value functions, while others learned shallow 12 functions.
14
Vigor increased with stimulus value earned the loss or gain that was associated with the stimulus. Notably, the loss that was indicated by the 20 negative valued stimuli was always less than the large penalty (10 points) that would be applied if the 21 participants did not make the correct saccade.
22
The left subplot of Fig. 2A illustrates saccade velocities for one participant in probe trials for +5 23 and -5 stimuli. The reaction times for these two stimuli are presented in the right subplot of Fig. 2A . In 24 response to the higher valued stimulus, this participant produced a saccade that had a shorter reaction 25 time, and a higher peak velocity.
26
To examine these trends across the participants, we normalized saccade peak speed and 27 reaction times for each individual with respect to their own mean as measured across probe trials (Haith 
2
We next tested the effects of subjective value on vigor. We observed that as subjective value 3 increased, saccade velocities increased (within subject effect, F(1,228)=33.6, p=2.3x10 -8 ), and reaction 4 times decreased (within subject effect, F(1,228)=62.2, p=1.3x10 -13 ), as shown in the right part of Fig. 2D .
5
[To make this plot, we began with the distribution of subjective values across all participants, and then 6 sampled that distribution into 10 bins of equal probability. Thus, the bins have error bars in both x-and 7 y-dimensions.] Together, these data demonstrated that vigor in probe trials was not a U-shaped 8 function of stimulus value. Rather, vigor tended to be smallest for stimuli that were associated with loss, 9 and largest for stimuli that were associated with gain.
10
Given the between-subject diversity in the relationship between vigor and stimulus value in 11 probe trials (Fig. 2C) , we wondered whether there was some characteristic of participants in decision 12 trials that dissociated their vigor modulation in probe trials. One clue was that some participants learned 13 a steep value function, while others learned a shallow function (Fig. 1E ). Indeed, we found that the slope 14 of subjective to objective values was modestly correlated with the slope of saccade velocity with respect 15 to subjective values (slope of velocity vs. subjective value compared to slope of subjective value vs.
16
objective value, r=0.49, p=0.019). That is, the participants whose saccade vigor was more strongly 17 modulated by stimulus value in probe trials tended to have learned a steeper value function, as inferred 18 from their choices in decision trials.
19
In summary, we observed that in probe trials saccades had reaction times that decreased with 20 subjective value, and peak velocities that increased with subjective value. However, there was diversity 21 in the strengths of these relationships. It appeared that saccade vigor was more strongly modulated by 22 stimulus value in those participants who had also learned a steeper value function.
24
Between subject differences in subjective value influence between subject differences in vigor 25 Some participants learned to assign a large subjective value to a stimulus, while others assigned a lower 26 value to the same stimulus. Could this between-subject difference in valuation be gleaned from the 27 vigor patterns?
28
To examine this question, we described our hypothesis via a graphical model (Fig. 3A) . In this 29 model, choice depended on subjective value, which in turn depended (through learning) on the 30 objective value of the stimulus. In our null hypothesis (H0, Fig. 3A) , the objective value affected vigor, 31 whereas subjective value affected choice. In our main hypothesis (H1, Fig. 3A ), objective value affected 32 subjective value, which in turn affected both choice and vigor. Under H1, if a subject had learned to 33 associate a small subjective value with a stimulus, then their vigor would be low in response to that 34 stimulus. However, if that same stimulus was valued highly by another subject, then their vigor would be 35 high. Thus, to test this hypothesis, we kept objective value constant and asked whether changes in 36 subjective value across participants modulated saccade vigor.
37
To help explain how we tested this hypothesis, Fig. 3B illustrates peak velocity in probe trials as 38 a function of subjective value for two different stimuli. For the +5 stimulus, some participants assigned a 39 large value, while others assigned a small value. Similarly, for the -5 stimulus, there was diversity in 40 assignment of subjective values. However, individuals that assigned larger subjective value to a given 41 stimulus also appeared to move with greater velocity in response to that stimulus (similar positive 1 slopes of the red and blue lines in Fig. 3B ).
2
To test for the consistency of this relationship, for each stimulus (constant objective value) we 3 measured the vigor of a participant (i.e., the y-value of a point in Fig. 3B with respect to the mean of the 4 points with the same color), and the subjective value that they had assigned (i.e., the x-value of a point 5 in Fig. 3B with respect to the mean of the points with the same color). Thus, given a constant objective 6 value, we measured how the between-subject differences in subjective value affected between-subject 7 differences in vigor (Fig. 3C ). We found that given a constant objective value, an increase in subjective 8 value produced a reduction in reaction time (F(1,228)=8.7, p=0.0036), and an increase in peak velocity 9 (F(1,228)=8.1, p=0.0047).
10
These results suggested that between-subject differences in valuation of a stimulus in decision 11 trials could be partially inferred from the between-subject differences in saccade vigor in decision trials: 12 participants who learned to associate a greater value to a given stimulus also tended to exhibit a greater 13 modulation of vigor in response to that stimulus.
15
Vigor was a modest predictor of choice 16 We next asked how well vigor measurements in probe trials could be used to predict choices that 17 individuals made in decision trials. To predict choice, we used only the vigor data in probe trials. The 18 vigor measurements produced two policies: a policy that assigned subjective value based on reaction 19 time in probe trials, and another policy that assigned subjective value based on peak velocity in the 20 same trials. For example, given the probe trial data for a participant, the reaction time policy assigned a 21 subjective value to the various stimuli, which we then used to predict choice in decision trials for that 22 participant. This served as the winner take all approach. In addition, we considered a likelihood 23 approach in which we predicted the probability that the participant would pick the sure option based on 24 their vigor patterns in the probe trials.
25
For the winner take all approach, we divided the decision trials into easy and hard based on the 26 difference in the objective value of the sure and risky options: easy trials were denoted by objective 27 value difference of 1 point or more, and hard trials were denoted by objective value difference of less 28 than 1 point. We quantified accuracy of the vigor policies based on the number of correct predictions 29 that the reaction time and the velocity policies made. To define an upper bound on prediction accuracy, 30 we also quantified performance of a policy that relied on the neural network that had fit the actual 31 choices (termed logistic fit).
32
The results of the policy comparisons are shown in Fig. 4A . We found that for hard choices, a 33 velocity based policy performed no better than chance (Fig. 4A , Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.99).
34
However, for the same hard choices a reaction time policy performed significantly better than chance 35 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p=0.0042). For the easier choices, both the velocity based policy and the 36 reaction time policy performed significantly better than chance (Fig. 4A, left 
38
In addition to predicting choice via winner take all, we also used vigor based estimates of 39 subjective value to compute the probability of choosing the sure option (Eq. 4). We estimated the 40 goodness of the vigor based predictions via negative log likelihood (NLL), and compared it to the NLL 41 1 choosing randomly (two-sided t-test, velocity: p=0.0026; reaction time: p=0.028).
2
Overall, using vigor in probe trials as a proxy for subjective value was informative, as the results 3 were better than chance. Reaction time was a better predictor than velocity, allowing one to predict 4 with roughly 60% accuracy the choices made by the participants. This compares with the ceiling 5 performance of roughly 80% accuracy when subjective value was estimated from the actual choices.
7
Vigor patterns in decision trials 8
In the decision trials the participants expressed their choices with a saccade. We asked whether vigor 9 patterns in the decision trials carried information about the contents of the trial. 
30
In summary, when the two options were both bad, forecasting a loss, velocity of the saccade 31 that reported the choice was low. As the value of the trial improved, forecasting a gain, saccade velocity 32 increased. Thus, in both probe and decision trials, saccade vigor tended to be low for trials that 33 predicted loss, and high for stimuli that predicted gain.
35
Discussion
36
The brain makes decisions based on subjective valuation of the available options. Yet, how we value an 37 option is a hidden variable that cannot be measured directly. Rather, it must be inferred from our 38 decisions. Is there a component of behavior other than choice that can serve as a proxy for subjective 39 valuation?
40
Here, we presented abstract visual stimuli that participants learned to associate with gains or 41 losses. We inferred the values that each participant assigned to the stimuli from their choices in decision 42 1 various stimuli, whereas others learned a shallow function. In probe trials, we presented the participants 2 a single stimulus near the fixation spot, indicating the value of that trial, and asked them to make a 3 saccade to a peripheral target. The reaction time and peak velocity of that saccade carried information 4 about the value of the stimulus: saccade vigor was lowest for stimuli that forecasted loss, highest for 5 stimuli that predicted gain. Notably, saccade vigor was more strongly modulated in those participants 6 who had also learned a steeper value function.
7
As expected, some participants valued a given stimulus more, whereas others valued it less. A 8 critical question was whether between-subject differences in valuation could be gleaned from the 9 between-subject differences in their patterns of vigor. We found that for a given stimulus (thus a 10 constant objective value) there was a relationship between subjective value and vigor: individuals that 11 assigned larger subjective value to a stimulus also tended to move with greater vigor in response to that 12 stimulus.
13
Finally, we asked how well vigor measurements in probe trials could act as a proxy for subjective 14 value, and thus predict choices that individuals would make in decision trials. We found that reaction 15 time was a better predictor that peak velocity, allowing one to predict with roughly 60% accuracy the 16 choices made by the participants (as compared to a ceiling of about 80% accuracy, as described by a 17 model fitted to the decision trials). Thus, vigor in probe trials was modulated by subjective value, 18 affording a modest ability to predict individual preferences during decision making. 19 20 Estimating subjective value 
28
Here we employed a different approach: we implemented a simple neural network, which we 29 found to be an efficient way to infer subjective values from the patterns of choice. Our specific learning 30 rule relied on a loss function that guaranteed that the result would produce the optimum prediction of 31 choices made by each participant. Our approach had the advantage that it allowed us to use a relatively 32 small number of decision trials (600) in which all stimuli were chosen at random. The method produced 33 reasonable results: subjective valuation correlated strongly with objective value (Fig. 1F) , producing 34 correct prediction of choice on roughly 81% of the trials.
35
However, we analyzed the data based on an assumption of stationarity of subject values. That is, 36 we assumed that subjective value was constant throughout the decision trials. We provided 100 37 baseline trials which provided information about value of each stimulus to the participants before the 38 decision trials began, but our assumption is clearly a simplification. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 39 analyze the data without the assumption of stationarity because in that case one must assume a 40 learning model, which introduces further unknown parameters that require fitting to behavior. However, 41 1 and look for correlations with vigor.
3
Subjective value monotonically varies with saccade vigor 4 The main question that we wished to ask was whether vigor of a movement was a monotonic function 5 of its subjective value across the range that spanned loss to gain. While subjective value may be lower 6 for a loss, the stimulus that predicts a loss may gather equal or greater attention than the stimulus that 7 predicts gain. The neural circuits that influence saccade vigor are affected by both subjective valuation 8 (Platt and Glimcher, 1999) 
36
Here our results unequivocally demonstrate that saccade vigor grows monotonically with 37 subjective value across the range that spans from loss to gain, and is not a U-shaped function. It is 38 possible that in some of the earlier studies in which cortical and dopaminergic activity increased with 39 punishment, the movement that followed may have been expressed with greater vigor (for example, 40 increased rate of blinking). 41 1 valuation from the between-subject differences in patterns of vigor. This is reminiscent of an earlier 2 study that found a monkey that did not show vigor sensitivity to reward also lacked dopaminergic 3 sensitivity to stimuli that predicted reward (Kawagoe et al., 2004 ).
5
Limitations 6
In our experiment the participants learned the value of the stimuli through observation (probe trials) 7 and choice (decision trials), but we analyzed the data as if the subject values were constant throughout 8 the decision trials. A better approach would be to have a real-time estimate of subjective values during 9 the task. However, such an approach would require fitting behavior to a learning model, which 10 introduces new parameters in the estimation problem. That approach remains to be developed.
11
In probe trials, the stimulus predicted a loss or gain if the participant performed the correct 12 action (saccade to target). However, if the participant performed an incorrect action (or no action), the 13 consequence was a large loss. Thus, in probe trials the participant could prevent a large loss by 14 performing the correct action, but could not prevent the smaller loss associated the stimulus. In a 15 different design in which the stimulus predicts a loss, but the correct action can prevent it, vigor of that 16 action will likely grow with magnitude of loss. That is, if the correct action can aid in prevention of a loss, 17 then we speculate that vigor would no longer exhibit the pattern we found here. This conjecture 18 remains to be tested.
19
To test whether subjective value affects vigor, we relied on the fact that among participants, a 20 given stimulus was associated with a range of subjective values. This between-subject analysis revealed 21 that individuals who valued a stimulus more tended to also exhibit greater vigor. However, in order to 22 conclusively infer a causal relationship between subject value and vigor we would need to test whether 23 within participant changes in subjective value produce changes in vigor. One way with which subjective 24 valuation may be increased is via expenditure of effort: individuals who expend effort in order to acquire 25 a particular reward tend to increase the value that they assign that reward. With saccades, effort with the plus or minus), each with a distribution as shown. The black stimulus was always associated with zero 8 points. C. We used a neural network to model the decision-making process. The input x was an 11 element vector, 9
with each element representing one of the stimuli 1 11 ,, xx starting from the most negative to the most 10 positive, and the black square (0 points) being the sixth element. On each trial, the input vector x was set so that 11 one element had value of -1 for the sure stimulus, two elements had value of +0.5 for the pair of risky stimuli, and 
4
The filled circles are measured variables. The unfilled circle is not measured but estimated. In the null hypothesis, 5 choice depends on SV, and both SV and vigor depend on OV. In the main hypothesis, SV affects both choice and 6 vigor. B. To evaluate merits of the hypotheses, we kept OV constant and measured variability in vigor as a function 7 of variability in SV. In this plot blue dots are peak saccade velocity as a function of subjective value (each dot is a 8 participant), for the fixed objective value of -5. The red dots are for the fixed objective value of +5. For a given 9 stimulus, some participants assigned a high SV, while others assigned a low SV. Vigor appeared to be higher when 10 the participant assigned a high SV to the stimulus. C. To consider the data in part B across stimuli, we found the 11 mean of the dot distribution for each stimulus (for example, the mean for the stimulus OV=+5), and then 12 represented each dot with respect to the within stimulus mean. The result revealed that for a constant OV, a 13 change in SV produced a change in vigor, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. 
